Recruitment of Africans in Ukraine: governments act in the face of growing evidence

One month ago, INPACT published The Business of Despair. The report, based on leaked databases from the war in Ukraine, listed 1,417 nationals from African countries who had been recruited by Russia, including more than 300 killed in action. 

The report put names and numbers onto an emerging issue across the continent. While some governments had broached the issue following high profile cases, the true scale of the problem had not been acknowledged, with many countries wary of disturbing relations with Russia. 

But there has been growing pressure from families and grassroots organisations seeking answers over disappearing loved ones. Public pressure has also mounted, with shocking videos of African prisoners of war and fighters — including the viral video of Francis, a Kenyan strapped to a mine, referred to by a Russian voice as “the can opener” before being sent ahead of his group. 

In the face of growing evidence and public outrage, African governments have been prompted to respond to the reality of their citizens fighting for Russia in Ukraine. What was once a matter of diplomatic silence has now become a clearly defined foreign policy issue: names, military service numbers and records are all documented.

African capitals begin to act

In Ghana, the government confirmed more than 270 nationals had been recruited by Russia, with 55 killed in action. These figures prompted Foreign Minister Samuel Okudzeto Ablakwa to take an unprecedented diplomatic step, traveling to Kyiv from February 25-27, 2026, to directly appeal to Ukrainian authorities for the release of Ghanaian prisoners of war – a first for an African minister on this specific issue. Speaking to reporters, Ablakwa described the figures as “depressing and frightening“, adding: “As a responsible government, we cannot turn a blind eye to these shocking statistics. This is not our war, and we cannot allow our young people to become human shields for others.” The government has also pledged to dismantle recruitment networks operating within the country.

In South Africa, President Cyril Ramaphosa officially thanked Vladimir Putin for the repatriation of 17 citizens, aged 20 to 39, who had been recruited under false promises of security or logistics contracts. An official investigation has been launched to determine the exact circumstances of their enlistment – the presidency reiterating that South African citizens are prohibited from joining foreign armed forces. This selective repatriation highlights the Kremlin’s operational logic, making token diplomatic gestures to preserve strategic alliances while continuing to deny the systemic nature of the recruitment.

Russian denial in the face of data

The stance of Russian diplomacy remains consistent: systematic denial, rhetoric of anti-colonial fraternity, and a complete silence regarding foreign losses. In Nairobi, the Russian embassy dismissed as “fake news” any recruitment organised on Kenyan soil, stating that it had “not issued visas to individuals wishing to fight in Ukraine”. This statement flies in the face of numerous testimonies from recruits and the families of missing men – many of whom contacted INPACT after the report’s publication – as well as an intelligence report presented to the Kenyan parliament, which estimated that approximately 1,000 citizens were sent to the front.

The Embassy’s effort to dismiss the story had little effect and Kenyan politicians from all sides urged action. Kenyan First Cabinet Secretary Musalia Mudavadi expressed “extreme concern” about “abnormally attractive” job offers leading young Kenyans to be recruited for frontline positions. More than 600 recruitment agencies were struck off the register. On the legal front, local recruitment agencies and several administrative officials are facing prosecution, accused of acting as conduits between structures linked to the Russian paramilitary apparatus and unemployed young graduates. These latest moves follow President William Ruto’s call for the release of all Kenyans detained in Ukraine, obtaining an agreement in principle during a phone conversation with Volodymyr Zelensky in November 2025.

In November, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha had already raised the alarm, indicating that 1,436 Africans from 36 countries had been identified within Russian ranks, a number that “could be much higher .” He described these contracts as “equivalent to a death sentence,” specifying that “most of the captured foreign fighters were taken during their first combat mission .” This situation was raised again during the visit to Kyiv by his Ghanaian counterpart, Samuel Okudzeto Ablakwa.

The data compiled by INPACT/All Eyes on Wagner from the database of 1,417 African recruits identified in 35 countries allows us to establish a partial picture of the losses — necessarily underestimated, as further research has already identified deaths not included in the initial lists:

  • Egypt: 361 recruits — the largest contingent
  • Cameroon: 335 recruited, 94 deaths confirmed — the highest death toll
  • Ghana: 234 recruited, 55 deaths confirmed
  • Algeria: 56 recruits
  • Gambia: 56 recruited
  • Mali: 51 recruits
  • Kenya: 45 registered in our database

In total, 316 combat deaths are documented, representing a mortality rate exceeding 22% among identified recruits – not counting the wounded and missing. The lack of official Russian communication regarding foreign losses makes any comprehensive assessment impossible at this stage. Researcher Thierry Vircoulon (IFRI) estimates the total number of Africans in the Russian ranks at 3,000-4,000, out of 18,000 to 20,000 foreign combatants . Among these figures, the case of Egypt particularly illustrates the complexity of the situation, combining the largest national contingent with a diplomatic response marked by discretion.

Egypt: the largest documented contingent, the most calculated silence

With 361 nationals recruited since 2023 and 52 confirmed deaths – average age 31, the youngest victim being 21 – Egypt constitutes the largest national contingent documented by INPACT/All Eyes on Wagner, ahead of Kenya and Cameroon. Recruitment was carried out through travel agencies based in Cairo, at least one of which was located in the immediate vicinity of the Russian Cultural Center – transforming a network of official cultural cooperation into an infrastructure for mobilising people for the front lines. The profile of the recruits is consistent with that observed in other countries: young men, approached with false promises of employment or training, many of whom were unaware that they would end up on the front lines in the Donbas. This is the case of Amar Muhammad, a student who went to Russia to pursue his studies, who found himself fighting in the Russian army before being captured by Ukrainian forces — a case documented by Nourhan al Sheikh, a professor of international relations at Cairo University, who also points out that any Egyptian serving in a foreign army faces a life sentence upon their return.

Despite the scale of the issue, Cairo’s response has remained deliberately discreet. In February 2025, the government imposed a security clearance requirement for citizens wishing to travel to Russia, specifically targeting men aged 18 to 35. This was an administrative measure, without any public statement naming specific individuals or any direct appeal to Moscow. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs merely reiterated its support in March for diplomatic initiatives aimed at ending the conflict, without mentioning the fate of its recruited citizens. This low profile approach is understandable: Russia is Egypt’s leading supplier of grain and a major player in tourism, accounting for 26.5% of international bookings through Russian tour operators, making any public friction with Moscow politically costly for the Sisi regime. General Mohamed al-Ghabari, a security expert, did call for raising awareness among young people about the dangers of foreign recruitment – but this warning remains confined to the realm of expertise, far from being a clearly stated government position. Egypt thus has the largest contingent and the most calculated official silence.

The families’ second battle: bodies and compensation

For families, confirmation of death opens a second case, often more opaque than the recruitment process itself. Russia treats its foreign recruits like second-class contractors. Without proof of a military identification number—UK or MT series—or geolocated communications, no file is opened on the Russian side. Families then become digital investigators, piecing together the last traces of their loved one from photos sent before their disappearance. 

Following the report’s publication, many families of men listed in the report – and some not listed – contacted INPACT asking for assistance in locating and repatriating bodies, obtaining official death certificates or any more information on the fate of their loved ones. The information obtained by INPACT allows us to piece together only brief biographies that will never fully satisfy the families’ expectations: “He signed his contract with the army on April 6, 2024, and was assigned the service number AB-032672. He was part of the 10th Armored Regiment of the 20th Motorized Brigade of the 8th Army . His death is recorded as July 9, 2025. We conducted further research, and at that time, his unit was in the Toretsk region, where there was heavy fighting. We therefore believe he died there. We don’t know what happened to the remains and believe they remained at the site of his death.” INPACT advises families to contact local civil society organisations or representatives who have been championing the issue, as well as Russian and Ukrainian missions.

Financially, the contracts promise between USD 2,000 and 30,000 in the event of death or disability. In reality – and perhaps by design – this compensation will never be paid out to African beneficiaries without a death certificate recognised by both states. Organisations like the ICRC are trying to fill this gap, but their ability to act remains contingent on the willingness of African governments to demand transparency from Moscow regarding lists of foreign combatants. 

A matter of sovereignty

This crisis reveals a structural tension for the states involved: maintaining military or economic cooperation with Moscow while simultaneously addressing public outrage over the documented exploitation of their youth. The repatriations negotiated by Ghana and South Africa demonstrate that a consular response is possible when a state prioritizes the protection of its citizens over its geopolitical alignments. For the majority of the countries concerned, silence remains the norm.

The documentation work continues. Each verified registration number, each name added to the list, is an additional piece of evidence that African capitals can no longer afford to ignore.

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